

53

~~TOP SECRET~~
HYBR/PDSUCCESS

ANNEX B

PARA-MILITARY

PART TWO by Assistant PM Officer, []

Departure from LINCOLN was made early in June with several purposes in mind to be accomplished upon arrival [] They were:

- a. Bring the shock troops to a state of preparedness which would permit the initiation of the campaign at an early date and at the same time would permit support of a premature uprising which might be caused by any one of a number of actions within the target country.
- b. Organize five-man "Hornet" teams for the harassment of the enemy in localities far removed from the obvious area of activity.
- c. Launch the remaining resident radio operators to their respective points.
- d. Move all shock troop equipment to selected staging areas near the border.
- e. Move by all possible methods, land, sea and air, arms to the inner organizations.
- f. Bring sabotage plans to the final stages. Ready the sab leaders for launching to their areas.
- g. Prepare [] for launching to his targets.
- h. Check the final military plans and modify them to suit the latest analysis of the situation.

Upon arrival, and after meeting with [] and [] as well as with all the leaders of the CASTILLO Armas organization, it was obvious that much of the above would be very difficult to accomplish in the short time which remained. It was apparent that CASTILLO Armas had very little knowledge of the numerical strength of his own organization. At various times he claimed to have from 300 to 500 men [] It was on the basis of these figures that the decision to form the five-man teams was made. During the attempts to form these groups CASTILLO Armas made a number of excuses as to why this could not be done. It was finally apparent that he undoubtedly did not have the men that he claimed to have and a list of all men [] was demanded by name. He submitted a list of men far below the number that we had hoped was present. The list contained 150 names. This not only did not permit the formation of the five-man teams, but it also did not furnish the required numbers for the shock troop organization. This information came only a week before the intended D-Day.

Upon the receipt of this information, my first inclination was to relay the shocking facts to LINCOLN with an urgent plea to postpone the initiation of the campaign. After much careful consideration, however, it was my decision that due to the possibility of gathering considerable

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
CSE/HRG
ON 11 JUL 79

~~TOP SECRET~~
RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

sympathizers along the way, we could launch the campaign as planned. I felt that any relaying of such information would have the effect of detracting from and dampening the enthusiasm of the CASTILLO Armas organization as well as having the effect of possibly postponing a campaign which might bog down hopelessly if not permitted to begin on schedule.

Much of the preparation for the campaign was made very difficult by the turn of events within the target country. The crack-down after the first leaflet drop made arms ingress almost impossible. Most of our methods broke down completely and we had to rely on such methods as [] and his plane delivering arms to his personal finca. We were able to send individuals across the line with arms in suitcases and bags. It is not known at this time how much of that was effective. We tried every method imaginable and we are confident that some of them worked. Even the launching of the radio operators was extremely difficult and hazardous for them. We are sure that a number of them were picked up and of those who did get to their respective areas, only a few came on the air.

[] had done a fine job of preparing the sabotage leaders and all were eager to get in and begin their work. There remained the problem of getting the proper equipment in for them to work with. Some was sent in through [] and some was taken in by hand. While mentioning [] it might be added that he had done wonders in organizing CASTILLO Armas' staff into the proper sections. All hands had the utmost respect for [] and his command presence as well as his language qualifications made him invaluable.

In looking over the final military plans, it struck me that the movement of our [] troops by way of Gualan would not only give the enemy adequate warning of the movement but the concentration of Communist personnel at Gualan would hinder our advance to such a degree that the [] enemy forces might stage a successful counter-attack. It appeared that a pincers movement on [] would be more likely to succeed. A plan was worked out to bring an additional force from Copan Ruinas down through Camotan and Jocotan for an attack upon Chiquimula and thence to []. The mission of this force was 1) to aid in the capture of [] in the event that the [] team experienced difficulty, and 2) if [] fell to us early, to move rapidly through the Jalapa area to the capital. In the latter case, the [] forces would protect the rear of this column. CASTILLO Armas' staff took to this plan with alacrity and it was decided that the CP would be with this group.

Much of my time was taken up with interviews of personnel newly arrived from Guatemala, both military and civilian. Upon the arrival of [] and, following an interview with him, I recommended that he be placed in command of the [] force, replacing []. I felt that as [] had been in command of the garrison of [] at one time, along with his higher rank and greater experience, he should be commander of this very important force.

Another arrival was Colonel []. I was very much impressed with his force and bearing and recommended him for some command. In this case it was command of the force which was to cross from Nueva Ocotepeque.

In the absence of the five-man teams for harassment, it was decided to utilize the talents of [] in this line. He had been most anxious to do something other than deliver arms to his finca and claimed to be able to perform bombing missions with his Cessna 180. I was frankly skeptical

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A63000~~

about the accuracy of such bombing, but he convinced me that it was feasible. [] constructed bombs of TNT blocks surrounding concussion grenades, armed so that they would detonate upon impact. [] took off on his initial flight of this type, headed []. He had with him two men, for as a "bombardier," He flew in almost on the ground toward the gasoline tanks at San Jose. As he approached the tanks, he pulled into a semi-stall and the bombardier threw the bomb. His first attempt was a direct hit and the tank burst into flame. He then flew to Retalhuehue and did the same thing to the SHELL and ESSO tanks there. He ran out of bombs but "strafed" the [] tanks with a Madsen gun, successfully puncturing them and then set them afire with grenades. [] flew another of these missions to []. His audacity was illustrated by his calling the field tower at [], saying that he was an air force plane wishing to land. The tower gave him the proper instructions and he came in to his bombing mission on the TEXACO tank. He received much AA fire as he tried to bomb an AT-6 on the runway of the field. In eluding the fire he dived into a group of trees and caught a branch of one of them in his control surfaces. He had to land at the first available field [] to remove it.

[] was very anxious to perform very hazardous missions at all times and was invaluable to our efforts.

Our safe house facilities in [] included a house where the staff of CASTILLO Armas could function as a unit. There we had maps, tables, conference rooms and briefing rooms. [] and I met there every day early in the morning and worked there all day with the staff. [] worked in another safe house, too, which served as a storehouse for our supplies. He worked with his sabotage leaders there. The latter house was located high on the mountainside outside of the city. Upon the arrival of the FCP radio personnel, we activated another safe house about halfway between []. This house was ideal for the radio station as it was well into the suburbs and comings and goings were not noticed. After this house was opened, we spent much of our time there.

Upon the arrival of [], the final touches were put on the plans and very shortly after his arrival the campaign was initiated. It should be noted here that the entire organization of CASTILLO Armas had completed confidence in [] and in his leadership. So far as I could tell, none of his decisions were ever questioned and for that matter, neither were any of mine, before he came. CASTILLO Armas made the same plea for strong air attacks to [] that he had made previously to me. He was not given any assurance whatsoever that air support would be forthcoming other than for air delivery of supplies, which we felt would be a sure thing. All of the personnel who came out of the country to us [] were of the firm opinion that, should powerful air blows be delivered on the city in the early phases, the campaign would not be a long one. The consensus of opinion was that if several bombs were dropped - on the Guardia de Honor, on La Aurora Air Field, on the Base Militar and possibly one other one on a selected target - the Government would fall immediately. Colonel [] brother [] insisted that the Government almost fell with the first leaflet drop.

Just before the arrival of [] our [] organizer returned []. He had been captured by several soldiers who recognized him from a former association in the army. He was tortured but escaped to return with valuable information. People were coming and going along the border at this time without interference, particularly in the [] and [] areas.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A63000~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
RYBAT/PSUCCESS

One of our big problems was the movement of men and supplies []
[] We had cooperation with [] an representative
[] was to the extent that he agreed to send a truckload of arms into
the country [] However, this did not work out. We
did send several loads of arms in specially constructed private automobiles
with false compartments. We had no cooperation from the President there.

Movement of shock troops to the staging areas began in small numbers.
Receiving parties were sent ahead and when we received word that the areas
were ready, movement was initiated. Movement was very slow and in very
small numbers. Finally, when time became short and D-day approached, more
speed was necessary and troops were moved in larger and less clandestine
groups. This movement caused a flood of newspapermen to descend []
[], making operations all the more difficult. Final movement of
the shock troops brought the operation fully into the open as it became
necessary to move the troops by commercial, chartered airplanes. This was
necessary in order to assemble the troops at the staging areas at the
proper time for the attack.

Difficulty was encountered in the plans for the seaborne operation
for [] for which we had purchased a boat at La Ceiba on the north coast
of Honduras. The boat was loaded with equipment which was delivered to
La Ceiba through the cooperation of [] who, incidentally,
was of tremendous help in many ways. [] transported equipment
in [] planes for us to many points and into fields which were
not well-suited to his planes. A group was dispatched to La Ceiba to man
the boat but discovered it to be missing. Presumably the boat had made
a run to the islands for cover purposes. Finally the team caught up with
the boat and boarded it for the operation. It is not entirely clear at
this date what developed from this operation. It is known that the boat
was picked up, but more than that is not known.

Communications were good with the exception that at night all con-
tact was lost between [] and SHERWOOD, thereby causing a terrific
pile-up of messages in the morning and a consequent bogging down of those
messages. There was considerable time lag between the sending of messages
from the field and their reception at [] For this reason, it was
decided to move the [] back to [] in order to give more
adequate service to the field. With respect to answering some messages
which came in from the field, it was frequently impossible to gain contact
with the field stations for some hours. More urgent messages would follow
and some of the original messages went unanswered.

With regard to security, it is obvious that many of the desirable
security measures which would normally be employed in a truly clandestine
operation were disregarded in this instance. In order to accomplish the
job, much of the clandestinity had to be abandoned. We had to move
openly in [] to and from safe houses, thereby un-
doubtedly identifying ourselves with the organization of CASTILLO Armas.
It can be said, though, that this movement was kept to an absolute minimum
and that some of it was absolutely necessary to accomplish the task. The
safe house where the FCP was located was by far the best and kept the most
clandestine.

After the movement to [], the FCP functioned much more efficiently
and was able to offer the desired support to the field. The fact that the
[] staff worked right with the Air Ops facilitated this support, in
addition to keeping everyone informed as to the field situation - which
situation had not existed prior to this time.

RYBAT/PSUCCESS

~~TOP SECRET~~
REF ID: A66666

COMMENTS

Other than the numerous small lessons learned during the campaign, there are, in my opinion, two main lessons to be learned from the overall situation. First, at the very outset of the planning for an operation of this type, a decision should be made as to the importance of its success. Upon reaching this decision, the amount of power to be utilized and the method of employment of this power should also be decided. This power (and in this case it was air bombardment) should not be withheld. It should be utilized at the very beginning of the operation. It is my considered opinion that if the air power which was used in the final phases of the operation had been used on the first day in the same manner, the campaign would not have lasted 48 hours. Undoubtedly, a few lives would have been lost in the bombing, but many more lives could have been saved by shortening the campaign. This opinion is based upon both the reports of persons who came from [] and my previous knowledge of the Latin people.

Secondly, I believe that the [] program could have been better coordinated with the [] program. By this I refer to the leaflet drops. The reaction to these drops was terrific. The results, however, were definitely detrimental to the [] effort, and the reaction of the staff of CASTILLO Armas [] was one of dejection. It was the opinion of all of us, including [], that it would have been well if the field had been consulted before the decision to make the drop had been made. The leaflet drops caused a crackdown within Guatemala which would have come eventually when the movement of our troops to the border was noticed, but it came at a time when we were still able to make delivery of arms, radio operators and sabotage personnel into the country. After the crackdown, it was virtually impossible to accomplish this. [] pleaded with us to permit no more leaflet drops as every one reduced the effectiveness of his air operations. The overall effect of such [] activity cannot be underestimated, but it is recommended that in the future they be coordinated with the [] activity so that they can be mutually supporting.

With regard to communications, as in operations in which I have been involved in the military service, much of the planning is based upon split second contact between units and command by radio. I have never seen this contact work out completely as planned, even with highly trained operators. In this case, with indigenous operators and difficult conditions, while the results were amazing, they did not work out as planned. Only in the final phases did the radio commo begin to work properly.

Finally, while an operation of this type is most difficult to keep clandestine, it would have been much more easily accomplished if the enemy had not been fully alerted some weeks before D-day. Had not martial law been proclaimed and the curfews, police patrols, etc., not been in effect, our movement and sabotage plans would have been much more likely to succeed. It is not known at this time how much of our sabotage was completed, but so far not much of it has been reported.

~~TOP SECRET~~
REF ID: A66666

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX B

PARA-MILITARY

PART FOUR - by FM Operations Officer, []

The following is a summary of the course of events from the time [] was dispatched [] 11 January 1954, to the end of activities against Guatemala.

The synopsis will attempt to shed light on all phases, that is: Training, organization, security, operational matters and the effect which the overall training had on the final phase and success of the project. This report is divided into three phases: (1) From [] departure to the White Paper; (2) Training period; (3) Setting up of the para-military organization of CASTILLO Armas [] Phases 2 and 3 are considered the most important as far as [] activities are concerned. They deal mostly with training and organizational setup.

PHASE I

Upon [] arrival [] a semi-organization for para-military activities had been set up. A total of fifteen men were on hand as the advanced training element. The equipment had not arrived and selection of the training site had not been settled.

Originally, training was to begin by 14 January but up to that date no facilities had been made available.

After considerable negotiations with [] authorization was given to commence movement of personnel and equipment to [] []

First difficulties encountered were movements of equipment and personnel while taking into consideration the most strict security measures. After an unsuccessful attempt to have [] furnish a boat for transfer and movement, negotiations with a private concern were made to rent a suitable launch. Cover story was that a crew of engineers were to work on private experiments for [] This story was maintained throughout entire project.

On taking over [] the only facilities made available were a barn and an inadequate water well. A complete training site had to be constructed. Two living quarters, mess hall, sanitary units and showers were built along with development of suitable areas for training activities. During this period evaluations, observations, complete interviews and background studies were made of the trainees. Food and building materials were shipped on a daily basis and continued until approximately 22 January.

On or about 22 January food shipments were discontinued, (reasons unknown to [] at that time) although daily messages were air dropped stating all was fine and that an attempt by [] was being made to purchase a boat to enable the project to discontinue use of the rented launch. No attempts were

made to pick up our distress messages telling that absolutely no food was available and that serious conditions existed [] although a pre-arranged method for pick-ups of messages had been made. (A rig had been constructed solely for this purpose.)

During this critical period [] had one serious malaria case, an appendicitis case, a hernia patient and two VD cases. No medical items had been included in the entire shipment of equipment. Every effort was made to justify the conditions to the trainees. It was certainly one of the darkest periods as far as the trainees were concerned and it is mentioned here only because [] was never allowed to forget it by the trainees who had experienced it. After a week of such conditions, a small boat arrived with small quantities of foodstuffs and building materials. [] immediately returned [] to inquire about the disorganized logistics.

On arrival at [] all newspapers were carrying the accounts that CHACO DELGADO had passed on to the Guatemalan government.

As [] was in the United States, [] immediately began liaison with [], requesting a new location. Arrangements were made and all equipment and personnel were evacuated that same night without incident or problems.

Again, the new location was without adequate facilities and work was begun immediately to construct suitable billets, training sites, etc.

During the brief stay [], some training had begun, primarily to develop a small cadre for future use as instructors.

A half-day training and work schedule had to be implemented. Labor units worked in the mornings and group instruction took place during the afternoons. Individual instructions were held after supper.

During this early training period only one major problem was on hand. It had been reported that the advance element would be comprised of CASTILLO Armas' top leaders who were to be semi-trained or experienced, and to bear in mind that they were to be the revolt's organizers. This was truly an underestimate. In fact, of the first twenty-seven trainees arriving at [] only four had the possibilities, or were considered capable, of becoming organizers or leaders. This later slowed down normal training operations because separate groups had to be maintained.

Schedules were revised and instructions changed to meet the requirements for the conditions originally set up. Three groups were established which consisted of officers, sab trainees and troops. Three complete running schedules, independent of each other, were drawn up. During the second phase of the training, sab trainees and troops were made interchangeable.

COMMENTS:

1. Security prior to the "White Paper" had been extremely lax on the part of the personnel working in [] This was primarily because no control was maintained over the personnel. No serious precautions or attempts at compartmentation had been undertaken.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Compartmentation was unheard of among the principal factions and contacts in most cases were made overtly. A cutout system was never employed.

2. No adequate facilities were maintained for complete security regarding incoming or outgoing correspondence. Safes were not made available and file folders were available for inspection by anyone. All personal folders were made interchangeable among the principals [] DELGADO and [] The "need-to-know" principle was never practiced. All conversations, even those regarding the highest operational matters, were discussed "openly" with absolutely no regard for security.

3. It is felt that because of the above lax security DELGADO was able to secure and photograph a large number of documents.

PHASE II

On receiving word to reactivate training at [] all efforts were then concentrated on the training program.

By the early part of March a total of 65 trainees were at []

The following schedule was adopted and carried out with full force:

- a. Classes for officers were held from 0700 to 1800 hours and from 1930 to 2230 hours.
- b. Classes for Sab personnel were identical.
- c. Classes for the troops were the same except for guard and KP duties.

During the first three weeks, theory and blackboard problems and instructions were in order. Classes organized for officers concentrated primarily on the following courses:

- a. Troop leadership.
- b. Command and staff problems.
- c. Map reading and terrain evaluation.
- d. Basic infantry tactics.
- e. Deployment of troops in guerrilla warfare.
- f. Guerrilla tactics.
- g. Effective use of fire power.
- h. Supply problems and aerial resupply.
- i. First aid.
- j. Attack on, and control of, cities.

~~TOP SECRET~~

k. Security

1. Nomenclature, care and cleaning of all weapons.

m. Tradecraft problems.

Subjects on which stress was placed were: Deployment of troops, effective use of fire power, aerial resupply, map reading, troop leadership and guerrilla tactics. Security was stressed in tradecraft instruction. Also included were lectures on cutout systems, contacts, surveillance, CE, CI, etc. After the theory and black-board instruction, live problems were conducted.

Officers were then assigned definite jobs and placed as group leaders. A continual rotation to various duties was mandatory for each officer to familiarize him with other duties in addition to his squad duties. Such duties as Sanitation, Mess, Adjutant, First Aid (Medical Officer), Instructor, Liaison, Staff Control, etc., gave each officer a wealth of experience.

During the same period Sab training was also conducted in full force. Selected Sab trainees totaled approximately 30, with an eventual prospect of using the best 20 for operations. The training commenced with preliminary theory instruction. During the course of training it was discovered that most of the trainees were limited in mathematical calculations and a simplification method had to be employed. Stress was on photograph targets, rather than mathematical calculation. Included during this period were simulated charge positions, actual handling of charges and detonators, electric wiring, handling and demonstrations of electric and non-electric caps, time calculations and improvised charges.

During the second week actual participation in sab problems was conducted by the trainees, permitting the student to attain the necessary confidence in handling explosives.

The third week was a continual nightmare for the trainees. Strict problems were conducted mostly at night. Stress was on target approach and coordinated attacks. A model village was erected in the midst of the jungle approximately six kilometers from []. It consisted of several small houses, rail track sections, small generators, automotive parts and gas and oil drums. Approach to target was consistently changed with simulated action being conducted while trainees were at work. Observers were always on the spot for checking of sab personnel or teams.

The third element, the foot soldiers, were instructed in care and cleaning of weapons, firing techniques, patrol and recon procedures, methods to overcome terrain difficulties, security, individual survival, first aid, map study, etc.

By late March and early April the three groups were working together in an effort to establish coordinated attacks. Constant critiques were in order. For final exercises a three day CPX was conducted.

On many occasions [] student tactical radio operators were utilized in training, sab and field problems.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMENTS:

1. During the entire Phase II period, [] bore in mind the necessity for developing "organizers" and in some respects viewed it with skepticism for the following reasons:

- a. The caliber of personnel sent to SARANAC was not what it was expected to be.
- b. Of the 99 trainees, only about ten were qualified as organizers.
- c. Most of the men were of the "hood" type and could only be utilized in regular troop units, guerrilla or sab teams.

2. For the above reasons the term "instructors" was designated to what was originally intended to be organizers. According to later results the organizers had been selected and were either living covertly or overtly in their designated targets.

3. Logistics: This was, above all, the biggest headache. It took anywhere from one complete day to two days for the purchasing of foods and materials to maintain the camp actively. Goods had to be purchased in [] Personnel had to be detached with a considerable loss of valuable man-hours.

4. Security: Overall excellent. Guards were posted on a regular tour of duty. During the period several stragglers were made captive and turned over to [] On one occasion, two "gun runners" were apprehended who later turned out to be principals in the attempted assassination of [] It was also during this phase that [] requested the transfer of [] to [] because of their laxness in security.

5. Liaison: Liaison was maintained with [] On a very good relationship, discussing periodically matters as directed by LINCOLN, procurement of documentation, local authority support, etc. Relationship with top [] officials was on such a confidential basis that it enabled [] to obtain considerable first-hand, high-level information with regard to internal and external government machinations. This is evident from cable correspondence maintained during that period.

6. Training: On completion of training, it was felt by [] that results obtained could be considered excellent for the following reasons:

- a. Ideological motives were chiefly involved rather than materialistic.
- b. Trainees were extremely eager and willing to learn. Their willingness to endure the hardship of training and their constant cooperation made it extremely easy to handle and instruct the men.
- c. The majority had been at one time or another political prisoners or tortured by the opposition.

- d. [] took advantage and exploited the "Sentimentalism," a Latin trait, at every opportunity.
- e. Trainees were made to feel "highly superior" in relation to the opposition troops by constantly indoctrinating them in the fact that they would be better trained, have superior weapons and fire power, and were led by highly efficient officers.
- f. Morale during the period of training was always high. Every effort to attain the best recreational facilities was made. Disagreements among the men were referred to [] and were always settled by boxing matches.
- g. The [] slogan was "We were born to die for God and Country." This was the premise by which the men and officers lived and trained and which was kept uppermost in their minds day and night.

PHASE 3

After closing [], [] returned to LINCOLN for reorientation, instructions and further preparations before departing to rejoin the CASTILLO Armas organization

On May 6, 1954, [] departed with instructions to act as the [] advisor and assist CASTILLO Armas in every possible way. The first few days were spent in just making observations and assisting wherever possible. To [] amazement, no semi-military organization had been established. A request to correct this situation was forwarded to CASTILLO Armas and he was asked to assign one of his top military aides to [] in order to begin organizing and building a staff. Colonel [] was assigned and made Chief of Staff at [] request. A definite military organization was then established, with G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 sections to insure the preliminary working stage for staff study, assignments, etc. Job assignments were then given to all officers to insure that all available resources were put to use in the best interest of the movement. Up to this time no such organization had existed despite repeated assurances by CASTILLO Armas.

Other sections organized were: A training center for the instruction of new arrivals, security section, and CI and CE working units.

Shock troop units, as well as Sab and instructor assignments, were organized.

Operations forwarded by LINCOLN were studied and necessary changes made because of rapid and constant changes in the internal situation in Guatemala.

Several separate operations were established which later had a strong bearing on the success of the project. These operations were those at Copan Ruinas, Nueva Ocotepeque, Morales and "La Siesta." For comments on results see Attachment 1.

It is extremely difficult to give a complete and full report of the successes and defeats of all military operations as well

as the Sab actions because of the lack of information and confirmations. All information on the successes and defeats mentioned in the Attachments are as a result of debriefings with the exception of "La Siesta" operation. The latter information was received on the monitored radio reports passed on by []

2 Attachments

SECRET

53

ATTACHMENT I

On June 16, 1954, all shock troops were in position. Those included other than [] and [] were [] and the [] troops.

Each of the above operations will be dealt with separately in an attempt to focus some light as to their successes or failures.

I. [] SHOCK TROOPS.

The assignment of Shock troops was to strike on the night of D-Day with the ultimate goal of completely sealing the exit of government troops that might attempt to assist or to control the rail line between [] and []

As far as can be determined and in the debriefing of one member of that force, the [] troops arrived at and did block the tunnel located approximately six kilometers from [] and also set up a block at Pierda Parada located on the Atlantic Highway on D + 1. From reports, several small guerrilla groups were sent to the outskirts of [] for harassment purposes. These positions were maintained for approximately three days.

Information received from monitored calls confirmed that opposition troops had been continuously flown from Guatemala City to [] with the primary objective of re-establishing the connection between [] forces with those of []

Approximately four days after D-Day, a sizeable enemy force counter-attacked and disorganized the [] shock troops. The troops dispersed and commenced retreating which eventually terminated at Los Corrideros, Honduras.

II. [] GROUP

This group consisted of approximately 30 organized men and had the mission of taking and holding [] located between [] and []

The group was quite successful and on D-Day captured [] and Bananera, holding both for three days until the break-through of the enemy forces from [] During this period the leader, had organized and reinforced his group totalling approximately 120 men.

Failure to achieve further success, according to [] was due to the lack of supplies. After a delayed action the group gave way and retreated, but not until they had caused considerable damage and casualties to the enemy forces. [] retreated to his jumping off base, Los Tarros, Honduras, with approximately 100 men.

His request for more supplies was granted and immediate steps were taken to consolidate the [] shock troops with the [] group with the primary object of retaking [] which has an airfield, by 30 June, and commencing movement toward [] with the objective of attacking and capturing it.

TOP SECRET

On the eve of 29 June this force was on the outskirts of [redacted], fully equipped, and ready to attack when word was sent of the peace negotiations, and to remain in position until further notice.

III. [redacted] GROUP

This group totaled 27 men who sailed from [redacted] to an area approximately above Santo Tomas which is located below and Southwest of [redacted]. Their primary mission was to harass [redacted]. This action was planned and coordinated so that they landed approximately D + 1.

According to monitored radio reports the group made a successful landing. The ship was discovered and captured on the day of landing, but minus its cargo and men. Reports further indicated that this group was fighting a winning battle against the enemy forces because the enemy [redacted] Commander, Colonel Bolanos, was consistently requesting additional reinforcements from Guatemala City to cope with the small force. It was not until nine days later that it was reported that [redacted] group had finally been defeated and that nine members had been captured. It was also reported that all were executed.

This group did not have a TRO. Several attempts were made to localize this group from the monitored reports but every one failed. It was therefore impossible to give them an aerial resupply or to aid them with air support.

It is felt that this group was the most courageous and sustained the enemy, limiting their objective in reestablishing the [redacted] and [redacted] connections by continuously defeating and harassing the city and keeping those elements occupied during the other battle phases.

IV. [redacted] SHOCK TROOPS

The primary mission of this group was in accordance with original plans. Only one change was made and that was to bypass Gualan by detaching a small group and blocking the small element that existed in Gualan.

According to the debriefing of the TRO, this plan was in order until a battle began between the enemy forces and the small detachment. The detachment requested aid from the shock troop leader who, with his force, was on his way to [redacted]. The troop leader temporarily changed his plans and returned to Gualan and captured same only after a fierce battle.

On taking Gualan, the shock troop staff moved into the cuartel to reorganize and build up their troops for continuation of their march to [redacted].

During this period, it was presumed by the TRO, that request for reinforcements had been dispatched to [redacted] by the Gualan commander prior to his defeat, because the following morning a sizeable force was detected coming from the direction of [redacted]. A battle commenced and lasted for approximately 50 hours with the complete annihilation of Castillo Armas' forces in Gualan. The only force not caught in this was [redacted] s detachment which had been deployed south of Gualan near Choyo.

The TRO was asked if any blunders were committed that might have resulted in the defeat. Subject stated that it was his honest belief that if troops had had enough rest that circumstances might have been different. He further stated that the trek across the mountains and the continual push by the commander to meet his dead-line resulted in only having fatigued troops. They were completely exhausted, even before commencing the fight, and the fighting continued for three straight days without them having the benefit of rest or sleep.

The later successes of _____ can be attributed to the tremendous losses sustained by the enemy due to both the battles of Gualan and the last ditch stand of _____

V. COPAN RUINAS AND NUEVA OCOTEPEQUE

These two forces can be included in the same movement, although their jumpoff points were distinctly apart. Both forces merged at Quezaltepeque for the eventual attack of Chiquimula.

The success of Chiquimula can be attributed to many situations, with only a few mentioned here:

The successful aerial resupply of these forces, the fact that the Advanced CP was here and the majority of the high level staff were together, the successful aerial support and the checking of a possible pincer movement by enemy forces coming from _____ to Chiquimula and a southern movement from Ipala. A force totalling 100 men were dispatched to check this latter group with success on the part of Castillo Armes' troops. _____ had maintained constant enemy OB situations from monitored radio reports and principally dispatched troops to this area to avoid a rear attack of the Chiquimula forces.

The capturing of a considerable quantity of munitions, weapons including 81mm mortars intact with large quantities of shells, was indeed evidence that the majority of troops had been dispatched from _____ in an early attempt to defeat troops there rather than at the strategic _____

The _____ movement never developed because of the intervention by _____
_____ These forces were merged with the Nueva Ocotepeque troops.

~~TOP SECRET~~
REF ID: A66550

ATTACHMENT II

SAB ACTIVITY

During the action, Sab activity was in action at the following points:

- a. Rail and communications between Entre Rios and Tenedores.
- b. Rail and communications between Tenedores and Morales and between La Libertad and Morales.
- c. Rail and communications NE of Gualan and NW of Gualan.
- d. Rail and communications NE of [] and NW of []
- e. The San Francisco Bridge, located below Tenedores.

The above sab activity was coordinated to assist all troops.

Other Sab operations were as follows:

- a. [] It was reported that destruction of the oil storage tanks, which was to have been the signal to begin activities, did occur on D-Day at approximately 2020 hours, just ten minutes before the exact time of plans.
- b. TGW. It was never reported whether an attempt or actual activity occurred against TGW. Although the station continued to broadcast, it was reported that TGR and other hookups had been grouped to enable the continuation of broadcasts also utilizing the Quezaltenango transmitters.
- c. All possible telecommunications in or around the capital by three separate teams.
- d. Rails and communications leading to El Salvador.

The Sab activity successes have been the most difficult to determine. Whether attempts or actual action was accomplished on selected targets is problematical because of the inaccurate reports, the tight security maintained by the enemy forces during the stage, and because of lack of information.